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SOVIET INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA (RP ) - CIA document
The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Latin America in the early s was as sudden as its meteoric rise in the region three decades before.
Its clients states were among the first affected. In Nicaragua, the left-wing Sandinista government was refused more cash ahead of the elections. After the Sandinistas lost, the Kremlin swiftly recognised the results of the elections and called for soviet assistance in latin america peaceful transition, soviet assistance in latin america.
In the same vein, Moscow drastically cut its economic assistance to Havana and in announced the withdrawal of its military brigade from Cuba. Similarly, soviet assistance in latin america, a wide network of sister communist parties across Latin America was left to its own devices. Soviet power and influence in the region was rapidly shrinking. However, international relations are rarely a linear affair, soviet assistance in latin america. It is not unusual for world powers to temporarily reduce their footprint in a region only to make a comeback later.
Russia, the legal successor of the Soviet Union, is no exception. After the Soviets' precipitous withdrawal from Latin America in the early s, Russia slowly worked its way back to the region. InRussia's chief diplomat made a first regional tour. At the dawn of a new century, re-engagement with Latin America picked up pace and Russia gradually began to repair ties with former client states and invest in new partnerships.
This culminated in the s with more high-level visits, increased trade, military exercises, scholarships for students, augmented presence in the information space, soviet assistance in latin america, arms supplies and diplomatic protection of regional clients. This 'comeback' calls for a thorough reassessment of Russia's posture in Latin America: the nuts and bolts behind its regional policy and its wider implications for Europe.
To do this, this Brief proposes to address several questions. First, what motivates Russia to look across the Soviet assistance in latin america and engage with Latin American states?
Second, Moscow is not re-engaging in the region with a clean slate nor is it operating in a vacuum; which factors are supporting and which are hindering Russia's policy in the region? Third, what is the provisional balance sheet of Russia's renewed engagement with Latin America?
Finally, what are the consequences for the EU of Moscow's resurgence in the region? The role of Latin America in overall Soviet foreign policy design was once described as 'never a priority…, [but] a possibility 1.
This captures not only the philosophy behind Soviet policy in the region but Russia's current attitude too. Unlike the post-Soviet neighbourhood, which Russia feels entitled to control and in which it at times feels compelled to intervene, soviet assistance in latin america, engagement with distant Latin America remains an issue of choice and possibility. Seen in this perspective, Latin America represents an arena in which the Kremlin seeks to advance a host of larger foreign and domestic policy soviet assistance in latin america. The first possibility relates to the US, a military power which from the Russian perspective challenges its interests in its immediate proximity.
The Kremlin regards its renewed engagement in Latin America as a way to balance Russia's asymmetric relationship with the US, if not in terms of capabilities, then at least in terms of the risks and threats each side has to face in their own neighbourhoods. The policy is designed to make the US feel more vulnerable in its immediate neighbourhood and raises the costs of its attempts to shape regional states' behaviour 2.
By doing so, Moscow considers that it is simply retaliating for the United States' disruptive behaviour in post-Soviet Eurasia, seen by Russia as its own backyard 3.
For example, the Kremlin sent its navy on a tour of Latin America in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war, when US ships made their way to the Black Sea and made a port call to Batumi, Georgia 4. This inter-regional soviet assistance in latin america is very frequent in Russian and Soviet foreign policy. For example, in the early s, soviet assistance in latin america, the Kremlin's withdrawal from Latin America was part of a much larger foreign policy enterprise to mend relations with Washington.
Accordingly, Moscow threw its allies under the bus in Latin America but also in Africa, to signal that it would refrain from causing trouble, in particular in what it saw as the United States' backyard. Two decades later, the Kremlin's foreign policy has come full circle. Disruptive behaviour in the vicinity of the US is meant to force Washington to heed Russia's concerns. The second possibility refers to Russia's overarching idea of fostering multipolarity in international relations.
Russia treats Latin America as another geographic theatre where it can advance its vision of a multipolar world and keep in check what it perceives as US global hegemonic instincts.
By reactivating its presence in a region far from its shores, Russia is demonstrating that it is one of the power poles with global, even if thin, military outreach. The Russian concept of multipolarity also envisions regional structures built around great powers 5. In this sense, Moscow looks at Latin America as an auxiliary source of international legitimacy for its regional projects e. But Russia's presence in Latin America is not only about solidifying its status in a multipolar world; it is also about stimulating strategic emancipation of regional powers or soviet assistance in latin america of states from the US shadow.
In this regard, cooperation with fellow BRICS country Brazil has been partially motivated by Russia's aspiration to see this state as a more autonomous player in a polycentric world, soviet assistance in latin america.
The symbolic political support through participation in summits, observer status, declarations of support that Russia provides for regional organisations which do not include the US in any form, follows the same logic 6.
The third possibility that Latin America provides is linked to Russia's top foreign policy priority region: its immediate vicinity. In this sense, partnerships in Latin America are regarded as useful tools to offset the negative effects of soviet assistance in latin america Kremlin's assertive policy in post-Soviet Eurasia. For example, in the wake of sectoral sanctions introduced by the EU in response to the destabilisation of Ukraine inthe Kremlin enforced a partial food embargo on agricultural products originating from the EU.
This move was not cost-free for Moscow: the ban fuelled food price inflation at home, hurting the most vulnerable social groups, soviet assistance in latin america. To neutralise the negative effects, the Kremlin looked to Soviet assistance in latin america America as an alternative source of agri-food imports.
Moscow also sought Latin American and Caribbean votes in the UN to gather as many states as possible against resolutions condemning Russia's policy towards Ukraine. Geographically, Latin America provided most of the votes 'against' 4 out of 11while a sizeable group of states from the region 15 out of 33 opted to abstain or to be absent 7. Last but not least, in times of tensions with the West, the Russian leadership occasionally used red carpet receptions in Havana, Buenos Aires or Brasilia in particular after the annexation of Crimea to dispel the impression that Russia had been isolated on the diplomatic stage.
Although re-engagement with Latin America is mostly about pursuing foreign policy ambitions, it also opens up an array of domestic possibilities for the Kremlin, soviet assistance in latin america. Throughout Putin's presidency, foreign policy has served as a source of internal legitimacy, especially in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea. Advertised on state TV, Russia's 'return' to Latin America aims to bring back the memories of the days when Moscow was and acted across the globe as a superpower, soviet assistance in latin america.
Thus, it is supposed to connect the Soviet's prestigious past with the foreign policy of today's Russia and fortify the president's image as a respected world leader 8. Besides the issue of political legitimacy, Latin America also serves more down to earth objectives. For example, the Panama Papers examined by a consortium of independent journalists revealed that Putin's close circle used offshore jurisdictions in Latin America and the Caribbean to conduct shadow transactions and manage secret funds.
The analysis of the documents indicates a possibility that some operations involved the transfer of assets and funds by third parties on behalf of the Russian president 9.
In addition to serving the soviet assistance in latin america interests of Russian governing elites, Latin America is viewed by Russian state companies as an attractive possibility to earn money from participating in infrastructure projects, investing in the oil and gas sector as well as accessing new markets for the export of machines, airplanes, soviet assistance in latin america, nuclear technologies, pharmaceutical products, raw materials and arms.
Often, Russia's business activities are associated with corruption schemes that weaken the rule of law and enrich elites tightly connected to Russian state companies.
Business relations between Caracas and Moscow in extractive industries speak volumes Possibilities do not turn into realities by default, soviet assistance in latin america. Success requires not only the political will to act, soviet assistance in latin america, but also favourable circumstances. There are quite a few indigenous and exogenous factors at play in Russia's game of influence in Latin America. Some of them are related to the Soviet legacy. For Russia, Latin America is not terra incognita.
Although it weakened significantly over time, soviet assistance in latin america, the Russian state machine was able to preserve expertise, a diplomatic network on the ground and institutional memory of engagement with the region.
Thus, Moscow did not have to start from scratch when it decided to reboot relations with Latin America. Another legacy aspect is a network of officials or business people who closely cooperated with Moscow in the past or were educated in the Soviet Union Former leftist guerrillas Daniel Ortega, José Luis Merino and Sanchez Ceren held top government positions at various periods and served as bridgeheads between Russian, Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran politics soviet assistance in latin america One additional feature of the Soviet legacy is the arsenal of military equipment exported to the region until the late s, maintenance and modernisation of which stimulated the demand for military-technical cooperation with post-Soviet Russia, soviet assistance in latin america.
This led to the opening in the country of a maintenance and repair centre for Russian-manufactured helicopters with wide regional coverage Data: European Commission, GISCO, ; 74 unique public sources were consulted when preparing this visual. Although these cannot be listed individually due to space limitations, the five most relied-upon sources were Reuters, TASS, Rosatom official website and The Jamestown Foundation. But not all advantages are legacy factors. Re-entry to the region has been favoured by domestic transformations in Russia too.
The oil boom of the s flooded the Kremlin with the resources it needed to conduct a bolder foreign policy. This made Russia attractive in Latin America as a potential business partner and source of capital.
Even if Russia did not turn into a generous regional investor in the end, these expectations facilitated its renewed engagement with Latin America, soviet assistance in latin america. Local favours supporting the Russian agenda such as welcoming the Russian navy or a vote at the UN were usually rewarded with Russian credits or loans This would not have been possible if Moscow had not substantially restored its public finances.
More financial resources also provided the Russian military with the funds to slowly modernise its power projection capabilities and ensure logistical backup. During the wars in Chechnya in the s, the Russian army experienced chronic shortages of fuel- 16but in the late s Russian armed forces were amply supplied with fuel, making it possible to undertake more frequent navy and airforce flag showing operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
As part of its charm offensive' the Kremlin also exploited a set of exogenous advantages. Just like the Soviet Union, Russia found more common ground with left-leaning governments in Latin America. The public image of Russia as a sort of resurrected Soviet Union and thus close to socialist ideals also helped As a result, the turn to the left witnessed in Latin America in the s opened the doors for Moscow to the circles of power in former client states or Cold War partners This was the case for instance in Nicaragua where Daniel Ortega reclaimed power, Bolivia under Evo Morales and Argentina under the presidencies of the Kirchner family.
The turn to the left also helped Russia to expand and deepen its relations with states who were not among Russia's traditional or preferred partners in the region before the s, like Chile, Venezuela or Brazil. This went hand in hand with a decline in the standing of the United States in Latin America. Speculating on anti-American sentiment, these less favourable attitudes towards the US made Moscow's reemergence easier.
However, this is not something that the Kremlin can bank on permanently. Over the last two decades, attitudes towards the US have fluctuated in the region; becoming more positive under the Obama administration and turning negative again under President Trump The bottom line is that the region is host to a sizeable constituency receptive to anti-West messages. Finally, among the factors which worked partially in Russia's favour were national or regional crises as well as soviet assistance in latin america agendas with minor extra-regional powers active in Latin America, such as Iran and Turkey.
For example, the political crisis in Venezuela substantially undermined the legitimacy of Maduro's leadership and increased the regime's dependence on external backers, including Moscow and its political and security support. The Covid pandemic allowed Russia to attempt boosting its soft power by promising its Sputnik V vaccine while highlighting the 'selfish' behaviour of wealthy Western states Russia's outreach to the region has been helped by occasional interaction with Teheran and Ankara.
For example inRussian planes transported gold as a part of a transaction between Venezuela and Turkey which provided Caracas with much needed financial resources In addition, Russia and Iran reportedly worked in parallel to help Caracas to circumvent Soviet assistance in latin america sanctions and resell oil from Venezuela
What are RUSSIA'S interests in LATIN AMERICA? - KJ REPORTS
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1 day ago · Russia, the legal successor of the Soviet Union, is no exception. After the Soviets' precipitous withdrawal from Latin America in the early s, Russia slowly worked its way back to the region. In , Russia's chief diplomat made a first regional tour. At the dawn of a new century, re-engagement with Latin America picked up pace and Russia Organizational Presence in Latin America. The Soviet diplomatic presence in Latin America is organized along linesthat of the US. Each embassyolitical and economic section. Therepeople, trade and aid personnel, and consular officers. Of theSoviets residing in Latin America, excluding Cuba, the best estimateercent are intelligencethese Soviet Historians On Latin America. Download Soviet Historians On Latin America PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Soviet Historians On Latin America book now. This site is like a library, Use search box in the widget to get ebook that you want
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